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EMBODIED REFLECTION 
 
When a dancer enters the stage to perform, her intention will most often be to communicate with 
her audience. Using her movements, affective and physical expressivity, postures and rhythms she 
will tell a story, express an atmosphere, explore an emotional or motional theme or an idea, or in 
other ways present - as well as constitute - the piece of art in question.  
Doing what one has learned by heart during classes and in the studio, in other words automatically 
performing (Dreyfus 2013; 2005) what after practising has become a second nature is often not 
satisfactory to the professional.  
 
During her bodily work the dancer will most often aim at using her prepared and incorporated 
moves, steps and expressions to explicitly articulate what she wants to share with the world.  
Through the work on stage further understandings of the dance piece’s content, or understandings 
of the other, of their interactions, of life situations mirrored in the performance’s sequences, might 
reveal itself to the dancer - as it might to her co-dancers, the musicians - and in the better cases to 
the audience as well.   
 
Artists from different fields seem to share this experience: Bodily and affective work has the 
capacity to lead to insights and knowledge.  
 
As a philosophy student I was thus looking forward to learn about the structures behind this 
transcendence of the bodily and affective self, and to define this particular path to cognition. By the 
end of our master programme it had still not been mentioned, and I asked a professor, a 
phenomenologist working on music. “Well, when it comes to terminology, no one has really pinned 
that out”, he said apologetically. “What you will find is that it is not recognized as a path to higher 
cognition. 
Provoked and inspired I then started the process of verbalizing and defining my own experiences of 
bodily consciousness in performing situations. I read up on the classical phenomenological 
descriptions of embodiment, and on embodied -, embedded -, enactive -, and extended cognition; 
the ‘4EC’. And I realized that even within the most body-embracing philosophical tradition, 
phenomenology, and – as far as I could see - the most up-to-date work on the 4EC, we still operate 
with a hierarchy where affective and embodied experiences of the self are seen as basic foundations 
for higher order conceptual reflection (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). 
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I read up on the current philosophical debate on expertise (Shear 2013; Dreyfus 2013; 2005; 
Montero 2013), and I learned that the discussion on self-consciousness in skilful activity is framed 
as a question about whether the expert performer of bodily action makes use of her reflective 
capacities during her activity, or whether she is bodily absorbed, in other words pre-reflectively 
self-conscious - and I thought:  
 
To reflect or not to reflect - is that the question? 
 
Further studies of the work of dance philosophers like Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Jaana Parviainen, 
Dorothée Legrand, Susanne Ravn and Barbara Montero, as well as a closer reading of Merleau-
Ponty’s essays on the painting artist (Merleau-Ponty 1961) made me realize that I was not 
completely off-track; they all discus the state of self-consciousness that my former colleagues and I 
have experienced.  
I empirically recognize and theoretically appreciate these philosophers’ elaborations on dancers’ 
states of self-consciousness, described by for instance Sheets-Johnstone as thinking in movement 
(2012; 2011; 2009; 1980), by Parviainen as thinking through movements in order to poetise 
meaning (1998), and by Legrand and Ravn as a form of reflective consciousness at the bodily level 
(Legrand 2013; Legrand & Ravn 2009). But these phenomenological descriptions seem to exceed 
the theoretical understanding of reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness found in classical 
phenomenology. The descriptions of the dancer’s state of self-consciousness have the common 
peculiarity of covering embodied absorption and reflective awareness experienced simultaneously.                                                                           
 
Theoretically we know that the reflecting subject observing her movements and herself attentively 
cannot continuously stay in the immediacy of her pre-reflective experience. Pre-reflective self-
consciousness is an integral part of phenomenal consciousness, and it constitutes the reflective 
experience, but it cannot in itself be an object to the subject. To be pre-reflectively self-conscious is 
a single experience with an immediate and non-observational nature, whereas reflective self-
consciousness is a situation involving two experiences of the self; 1) the experience of reflecting, 
and 2) the experience of being the object reflected upon. The experience and consciousness of the 
self alters through reflection, and differs irreducibly from the experiences of the pre-reflective self 
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(Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 50-57; Zahavi 1999, 198). In other words, the phenomenological 
framework is challenged when it comes to an understanding and a definition of dancers’ 
experiences of being, as some dancers describe it: in a trance and yet hyper-aware. 
Writing about this dilemma I made theoretical as well as qualitative research. I interviewed four 
dancers; a classical ballet dancer, a contemporary dancer, a classical Indian dancer, and a former 
ballet dancer now choreographer. As the general performing situation aggregates a wide range of 
experiences of the self, the interviewees report of various incidents of being reflectively self-
conscious, as well as incidents of being pre-reflectively bodily immersed in their actions. But to 
three out of four research objects the abovementioned puzzling bodily transcendence is the pursued 
and preferred state of self-consciousness while working on stage. Aligning the empirical material 
with the phenomenological theory on reflection and pre-reflection, I realized that the interviewed 
dancers describe this specific bodily self-consciousness on stage with terminology traditionally used 
on the order of reflection: they are attentive - bodily attentive, that is. They are intensely self-aware, 
explicitly aware of the other and the world, and they are disclosing experiences through 
transformation - by means of the body. They are affectively and-or bodily articulating what they 
experience pre-reflectively, and they are - through their bodily selves - thematically transforming or 
reproducing something received or grasped from their second-nature, from other pre-reflective 
experiences, or even from conceptual ideas.                     
These are word-to-word descriptions of reflection (Husserl 1960, 38; Husserl 2012, 68; Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2008, 46; Zahavi 1999, 62). One might assume these as indications of conceptual 
reflectivity; yet, there is a simultaneous lack of thinking and of conceptual control in this state. The 
dancers report of having artistic blackouts, feeling something taking over, feeling someone else 
leading their arms and legs, experiencing being in a trance. They notice how movements and 
expressions are appearing through their body, and they experience artistic material asserting itself 
through them.  
 
Let‘s have a closer look at the descriptions a couple of the interviewed dancers gave.  
Performing, contemporary dancer Pedersen claims to have experiences consisting of attentive 
awareness and various degrees of absorption simultaneously. She is generally what she calls mega 
conscious on stage – as “one has responsibilities and has to be extremely aware”, as she puts it. 
  Buttingsrud !
 Proceedings of A Body of Knowledge - Embodied Cognition and the Arts conference CTSA UCI 8-10 Dec 2016  
5!
Occasionally she experiences getting into a trance. The absorption that she describes as a trance 
does not intrude with her awareness, on the contrary: “One is still fully awake”, she says, “actually 
more awake than when walking down the street.” Pedersen describes her body as being extremely 
alert in this state, “as if even the hairs on my arms are aware of what is going on.” 
 
In this state she does not register personal emotions or bodily feelings, such as whether the room is 
cold or warm, or if she feels low, or in good spirits, on a private level. It is rather a here-and-now 
awareness, which she does not evaluate. It is experienced merely as it is, she states. Pedersen 
clearly feels her bodily presence in the space and is observant and attentive when it comes to the 
other dancers and their activities – “putting out my feelers”. Even though her awareness is upon the 
world around her, she is just as aware of her own dance work. Through her descriptions it seems 
evident, that she is experiencing a bodily focus on the living body (in phenomenology distinguished 
as Leib), rather than on the physical (phenomenologically known as Körper). Barely recognizing 
her anatomical body, the work takes place in what she calls a transformation of her emotional 
expression through the movements.  
 
Pedersen is not taking her physical body as an object and her state of awareness cannot be defined 
as a reflection upon her own body as such. She is sensuously and kinaesthetically alert and focused 
on her task, which is attended to with great explicitness as she discloses the theme of the 
choreography through this transformative process. Through her kinaesthetical interpretation the 
choreography unfolds and reveals its inherent sense and meaning. Phenomenology tells us how 
transformation through reflection makes a previously dumb experience articulate its own sense 
(Husserl 1950, 77) (Zahavi 1999, 64), and this description seems to have a quality of familiarity 
with the bodily process Pedersen is undergoing on stage. 
 
Pedersen is thus both absorbed, attentive, and transforming her material - simultaneously. 
 
Modern ballet dancer and choreographer Holm is a former solo ballet dancer. During the five 
decades he has created dance performances, Holm claims to have depended upon his body, his 
sensuousness and imagination, rather than upon conceptual decision-making and planning. He calls 
it an anti-method, and he feels convinced that his huge load of previous events and factual 
knowledge – cooperating with his personal intuitive ability to sort out – simply dictate him from the 
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first line (Holm 2014, 31). These experiences seem to be of a pre-reflective character; Holm relies 
on his embodied skills that after a lifetime of professional bodywork have become second nature to 
him. But Holm additionally refers to the process of choreographing as a reproduction of something 
received. From where he is not sure: “I’ve never been introduced to the god of choreography, or 
whoever it is talking through me”, he says laughing. 
 Having! authored! several! books,! Holm! has! verbalized! his! experiences! of! dancing! and!choreographing.!!Here’s!a!quote!from!one!of!his!last!works:!! I! have! made! dances! in! a! somewhat! similar! way! throughout! a! long! life! of!choreographing.! I!am!not!roaming!about! in!a!dance!studio!alone!preparing!steps!and!movements.!I!observe!and!sense!atmospheres,!music,!and!am!of!course!already!familiar!with!the!content!of!the!performance!at!stake.!I!know!in!detail!what!it!will!express,!how!long!or!short!one!and!the!other!scene!will!be.! In!my!imagination!I!can!clearly!see!the!dancers!doing! it!all.! !But!when!I!meet! the!dancers! I!am!blank!when! it!comes!to!steps!and!movements.!There!we!stand,!I!use!an!inspiring!piece!of!music!H!or!maybe!not!H!and!standing!in!front!of!a!dancer!or!two!or!five!I!improvise.!!I!don’t!mind!confessing!that! I’ve!often!felt! it!as! if!someone!or!something!dictated!me,!led!my! legs! and! arms,! and! once! it!was! close! to! a! religious! experience! or! at! least! an!experience!endowed!with!spirit.! (…)! I! composed! the!act!within!one!and!a!half!hours.!And!I!didn’t!change!the!move!of!a!finger!afterwards.!(Holm,!2014,!32)!(Author’s!translation)!
 
When he adjusts the scenes with his dancers, this happens in what he calls an attentive trance 
(Holm 2014, 33). He explains that the trance part of it is a one hundred per cent openness, a 
submission to his bodily conditions. It is a deliberately chosen state in which he pursues his inner 
vision of the choreography. He cannot explain it further, he says, and claims that it is merely a 
pocket that he slips into in order to perform his craft. The attentive part of it lies in how his physical 
cooperation with the dancers enables him to see possibilities in their movements, and in the space 
where they are moving together.  
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Holm is thus bodily attentive and creative as his kinaesthetic, emotional, and perceptual logos is 
producing the dance steps required to finish the choreography of the performance he has in mind - 
as well as in body.  
 
Gathering our material, we can now conclude that the dancers’ statements represent the same 
theoretical dilemma that we saw in the dance philosophers’ work: How can the dancing subjects’ 
experiences be attentive and immersed simultaneously?  
Would it be possible to recognize this seemingly contradictory experience as either conceptually 
reflective, or as pre-reflective, or as an experience consisting of a combination of the two, where the 
subject alternates between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness? 
 
The dancers’ stress on profound attention eliminates pre-reflectivity as the adequate term for this 
specific state. Yet, the attention is not on, but emerges through the body, thus it does not make 
sense to define the attention in question as conceptually reflective.  
Even though it shares characteristics with pre-reflective as well as with reflective self-
consciousness, this seemingly two-fold mode of awareness is neither reflective nor pre-reflective 
in the traditional understanding of the terms. As a consequence, the mode cannot be the result of 
an alternation between pre-reflective and reflective self-consciousness; it’s attentive and thereby 
reflective aspect is not identical with the reflection in conceptual reflective self-consciousness. 
The puzzling factor is not the immersion, but the attention, it being the bodily self’s focus upon its 
activity and this activity’s context.  
Besides, in the close connection between immersion and attention in this state, one is causing the 
other in a constant reinforcing intermingling: the dancers are attentive by virtue of their embodied 
absorption, and their immersion is profound by virtue of their focus and attention. This persistent 
unification throughout the activity constitutes the very existence of this state, as well as its 
characteristics.  
The case of two individual states of self-consciousness momentarily replacing each other seems to 
be a different experience from the experience of the state we are discussing. 
 
Thus, there seems to be an experientially lived as well as theoretically seen experience in which the 
subject’s bodily self ‘thinks’, or reflects, or accesses herself as object, through, or in, or by means of 
her embodied activity - in which she is completely immersed. Even though it shares certain 
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structures with the other states, this proposed third state of self-consciousness appears irreducible to 
reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness respectively. In this state the subject’s attention is 
springing from and is of her bodily self, more specifically the subject’s movements and/or her 
emotions, that is her living body – what we know as Leib (Husserl, 1952). 
 
In summing these observations up, we can see that the state of self-consciousness in question is 
reflective, non-conceptual, and embodied. As a reflective state it takes objects. Yet it stays in the 
immediacy of the lived body. This phenomenon has been described philosophically. Yet, it 
contradicts the phenomenological theoretical framework. It is in need of comprehensive 
academic elucidation.  
I call this distinct state of self-consciousness embodied reflection. Talking!of!matters!concerning!the!bodily!self!I!prefer!‘reflecting’!to!‘thinking’.!Due!to!its!unambiguousness!‘thinking’!might!be!misleading.! The! verb! ‘to! reflect’! has! a! broader! field! of! utility,! as!we!might! talk! of! ‘how! the!sunlight! is! reflecting! off! the! window’! as! well! as! of! conceptual! reflection.! The! etymological!background!of!‘reflecting’!is!the!Latin!word!reflexus,!which!means!bent+back,!and!thus!inclines!an!inputHoutput,!actionHreaction!movement.!
 
Let’s have a look at the characteristics embodied reflection shares with pre-reflective and 
traditionally reflective self-consciousness respectively.  
Embodied reflection shares the aspect of immediacy with pre-reflective self-consciousness, the, in 
Husserl’s words straightforward mode with which one undergoes one’s experience (Husserl 1960, 
34).  
To reflect bodily does not imply the dichotomy normally found between the reflecting subject and 
the object reflected upon. There is no switch from implicit embodiment (pre-reflection) to a focus 
of the mind (reflection), the change in the way the object appears to the subject happens and stays 
within the embodied realm. The object of embodied reflection is often to be found in the subject or 
in the subject’s horizon. It can be a movement, a beat or rhythm being processed through the 
subject’s body, an affective expression, the sense of an atmosphere finding its way through the 
steps, and so on. The dancer might bodily transform and communicate almost any aspect of the 
dance piece; the mere physical movements, the emotional content of the piece, or even conceptual 
ideas behind the performance. As the subject is presenting the objects through her bodily and/or 
affective self, and as the body is the reflecting aspect of the self, immediacy is intact during this 
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bodily reflective experience - there is no change of temporality, and no distance between the object 
and subject in embodied reflection. 
 
Another characteristic embodied reflection shares with pre-reflection is the lack of conceptual 
reflection. When artists report of having had blackouts or having been in a trance these are to be 
recognized as experiences where conceptual thinking was momentarily kept on hold. To reflect in 
bodily terms is the experience of having an extremely intense focus through the embodied-
emotional self, in a situation where one is absorbed in an activity of a bodily or emotional nature. 
Even though the artist might not rationally remember her experience on stage after having been in a 
trance, and she might be unable to give a verbalized account of the experience, her bodily self 
remembers and is indeed aware of the transformation she has undergone: after such a performance 
one often feels fulfilled, elated, euphoric, or ‘high’. It seems evident that artistic blackouts are 
neither experiences of loosing one’s consciousness, nor of loosing one’s self. On the contrary, it is 
an experience of a radical focus within the self – within the embodied self. The notion of self-
forgetfulness in absorbed activity reveals a dualistic approach to the self; it speaks of the self 
exclusively as minded, ignoring the self-experience of the bodily self. 
 
Additionally to the absorption and lack of conceptual reflection, embodied reflection shares 
‘movement pattern’ with the pre-reflective. There seems to be a difference in the way reflective and 
pre-reflective self-consciousness ‘moves’. Where the conceptually reflective action makes one’s 
awareness ‘move’ like a laser ray and meet one’s object by narrowing down to the point, the pre-
reflective ‘move’ is an open embrace. Experiencing embodied reflection one’s focus is not like a 
scrutinizing look or a pointing finger; the focusing lies in actively opening oneself in order to 
embrace the wholeness of the context. This may concern the quality of the objects of embodied 
reflection, but more specifically it concerns the approach and attitude found in the subject. What 
has been called ‘passivity’ and ‘lack of control’ - due to conceptual passivity and the lack of 
conceptual control– is in this case rather an ability to actively submit oneself to one’s activity and 
this activity’s context. This is characteristic of the way this self-consciousness ‘moves’ - not to be 
confused with the activity in which one experiences embodied reflection. 
When it comes to the characteristics embodied reflection shares with reflection, we have already 
learned of the attention, explicit self-awareness as well as explicit awareness of the other and the 
world, of the thematizing, the transformation and reproduction of objects received or grasped, of 
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the disclosure of objects through transformation in and through the embodied, and the articulation 
of emotional and bodily experiences, that the subject undergoes in embodied reflection. These 
experiences all share traits with reflective self-consciousness. 
I have hereby presented the proposition of a reflective order of embodiment. To reflect through the 
bodily aspect of the self is neither mystical, nor is it exclusively experienced by artists or experts. I 
believe we all have the capacity to reflect affectively and bodily – playing as children, during erotic 
convergence, and during sports, yoga or meditation, just to mention some situations. It is merely the 
universal human experience of being profoundly focused through non-conceptual aspects of the 
self. 
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